The vendor puts forward two plans for the same project. Under the first, the system goes fully live in fourteen months. Under the second, one part starts running in month five and the rest the following year. Same final scope, same price: €165,000.
Almost every management team picks the first. It has one date, one invoice and one difficult conversation. Picking it costs around €60,000.
Let us look at where that figure comes from and how to calculate it for any project.
The pieces of the calculation
Before comparing the two plans, a few concepts need pinning down.
The first is to look at cash flows: the money leaving the account and the money coming in, each with its date. Not the budget, nor the accounting profit, but the movements and the moment they occur.
The second is that a euro today is worth more than a euro in three years' time, because today's euro can be put to work in the meantime. To convert future euros into today's euros you use a discount rate. The usual reference is the WACC, the weighted average cost of capital: the minimum an investment must return to justify tying up money in it. In a mid-sized company it tends to sit between 8% and 12%, according to the sector data published by Damodaran (NYU Stern), and for a system replacement the range has to move up somewhat to reflect the project's added risk. I use 12% here.
Those two pieces give you NPV, Net Present Value: every cash flow of the project, investment included, brought back to today's euros and added up. If it is positive, the project creates value. If it is negative, it destroys it.
What matters from here on is this: NPV does not depend only on how much you pay and how much you take in, but on when. And the «when» is set by the delivery schedule.
The two schedules
An electrical supplies distributor: €8.2 million in revenue, 46 employees, a management system installed eleven years ago. Replacing it costs €165,000. Once everything is running, the estimated saving is €96,000 a year across order automation, fewer inventory incidents, and reporting that today is assembled by hand in spreadsheets. That is a little over 1% of revenue, a credible figure in a company that still runs much of its operation manually.
Those two numbers, €165,000 and €96,000, are identical under both plans. The only thing that changes is the order.
Plan A, all at once. The whole project is paid for up front. During the first year it is implemented and there is no return. From year 2 onwards the system delivers its €96,000 a year.
Plan B, in two phases. The first block goes live in month five.
| Phase | Investment | When it is paid | Saving it adds | From |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 — Purchasing, warehouse and invoicing | €90,000 | Year 0 | €58,000/year | Year 1 |
| 2 — Sales, after-sales and reporting | €75,000 | Year 1 | +€38,000/year | Year 2 |
| Total | €165,000 | — | €96,000/year | — |
The result
| Item | Plan A (all at once) | Plan B (in two phases) |
|---|---|---|
| Present value of the investment | €165,000 | €156,964 |
| Present value of the savings | €352,406 | €404,192 |
| NPV | €187,406 | €247,228 |
€59,821 of difference, 32% more value. Against a budget of €165,000, that difference is equivalent to 36% of what the whole project costs, and it appears without spending a euro more or promising a euro more of saving.
Where the difference comes from
It is worth opening it up. There are two effects, and both can be checked separately.
| Effect | What happens | Value | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Savings brought forward | The first euro arrives in month 5 instead of month 14. The whole return curve shifts forward by a year and more. | €51,786 | 87% |
| Capital deferred | €75,000 of the budget is paid a year later. In today's euros, the same €165,000 costs €156,964. | €8,036 | 13% |
| Total | — | €59,821 | 100% |
The weight sits clearly with the first effect. Deferring payments helps, but what really moves the result is the system starting to pay back sooner. And none of this rests on a debatable assumption: there are no probabilities, no adoption estimates, no optimistic projections, only discounted cash flows. That makes it a comfortable argument to defend in front of a managing director or a finance director — it does not require anyone to take anything on faith.
The same story, year by year
The chart shows the cumulative NPV of each plan: how much value the project has generated, in today's euros, at the close of each financial year. It starts negative, because money has gone out and nothing has come back yet, and it climbs from there.
Plan B's curve crosses zero during year 3; Plan A's, during year 4. That crossing is the discounted payback, the moment the project has returned, in today's euros, everything it cost.
The lowest point of each curve says something too. It is the maximum exposure: the money the company has committed without having recovered anything yet. Plan A reaches €165,000 and Plan B never goes past €105,179, some €60,000 less capital at risk at the worst moment. For a company with €8 million in revenue, that weighs on the decision as much as the NPV does.
And there is a detail in the shape of the curves that explains a good deal. From year 2 they rise in parallel, because from that point both plans take in exactly the same amount. The band separating them is the same width in year 2 as in year 7, which is why the €60,000 difference in committed capital and the €59,821 difference in NPV are the same number: they are not two advantages but one, seen at two moments. It is created entirely during the first fourteen months, and from there it is only preserved.
What to do with this
Phasing is not free. Temporary connections have to be built between the new system and the part of the old one still running, people are trained twice, and the organisation lives for a few months with half-migrated processes. That extra cost is real and has to be counted. In this case Plan B absorbs up to 38% of cost inflation before losing its advantage, so the margin is wide, but it is not infinite.
From which comes the one thing that has to be right: where the cut is made. The first phase has to leave behind some process that can be run end to end without depending on the old system. If it leaves a circuit spanning three departments half-finished, a temporary bridge will be needed to hold it up, and that bridge eats the difference. Cutting along catalogue modules or along the org chart is the most common way to get it wrong, and it usually ends with the conclusion that incremental delivery does not work.
There is also an advantage this calculation does not even capture. When the first phase ends you already know how the organisation has responded, and the money for the second is still uncommitted. If adoption does not materialise, or the data turns out to be worse than it looked, you can stop having spent €90,000 rather than €165,000. That ability to change course is what finance calls a real option: the right to do something without the obligation to do it. It has economic value, it can be calculated, and it pushes the gap between the two plans wider still.
None of this requires a complicated model. Take the budget and the estimated annual saving, write two rows of cash flows — the schedule you have been offered and an alternative one where the first block goes live sooner — discount both at your WACC, and subtract. It is an afternoon's work in a spreadsheet.
And there is one question worth asking before signing anything: in which month does the first euro arrive? Not when the project finishes, but when it starts paying back. It is the date in the plan that carries the most weight in the NPV and, on most projects, the only one nobody has calculated.
The delivery schedule moves the NPV as much as the price does. It deserves the same discussion.
SUBSCRIBE & FOLLOW
Interested in the financial evaluation of technology projects?
This article is part of a series on Corporate Finance methodologies applied to digital transformation. Follow the project via RSS, connect on LinkedIn for daily insights, or explore related articles below.
Ángel Carlos del Pozo Muela
Executive MBA · Corporate Finance Applied to ERP ProjectsComputer Engineer specialising in Enterprise Information Systems.
Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily represent the position of any organisation the author is associated with.
References and sources
- Damodaran, A. (NYU Stern). Costs of Capital by Industry Sector — Europe. Sector cost-of-capital data, updated January 2026. Available at: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datacurrent.html
- Damodaran, A. (NYU Stern). The Promise and Peril of Real Options. On the limits of discounted cash flow in capturing the value of flexibility. Available at: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pdfiles/papers/realopt.pdf